In an article for The National Law Review, Glenn Agre managing partner Andrew Glenn and partner Agustina Berro argue that the antitrust attack on lender cooperation agreements is unlikely to succeed.
Co-ops have become one of the most important tools available to minority creditors navigating LMEs. Two cases now before the Southern District of New York, Deltroit Directional Opportunities Master Fund Limited et al. v. Selecta Group B.V. et al. and Optimum Communications, Inc. et al. v. Apollo Capital Management, L.P. et al., put these agreements directly in the crosshairs of antitrust law. The theory is that when lenders agree to act together, they engage in the kind of illegal coordination the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
Why the Antitrust Theory Falls Short
The cases compare co-op agreements to drug suppliers banding together to fix prices or exclude a competitor. Andrew and Agustina explain that this comparison breaks down immediately. Lenders in a co-op are not competitors in any meaningful sense. They are parties to the same credit agreement and assert rights under the same document, which itself requires collective action to enforce those rights.
Restructurings depend on coordination, and creditor groups routinely operate under engagement letters that require voting in a certain construct. In the authors’ view, applying this antitrust theory would be “value destructive for the entire market and would throw established restructuring practice into chaos.”
What Courts Are Likely to Do
The authors do not expect either case to find co-op agreements categorically illegal. More likely, courts will scrutinize specific provisions, and some of the more aggressive or prospective terms may not survive. Provisions that lock lenders into set voting positions, restrict trading, or penalize independent engagement with a borrower carry more risk than those that simply require members to share information and negotiate together.
What This Signals for the LME Market
The antitrust push is itself evidence that co-ops are working. Minority lenders have become harder to pick off, and the divide-and-conquer strategies that made early LMEs effective are less reliable against organized, disciplined creditor groups.
Their bottom line: minority lenders should not be deterred from organizing by the threat of antitrust litigation. Lenders have coordinated under credit agreements for decades, and if this theory had merit, it would have been advanced a long time ago.
Read the full article published in The National Law Review.